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“Again and again Blackfeet warriors fleeing northward after a raiding attack
watched with growing amazement as the pursuing troops of the United State
Army came to a sudden, almost magical stop. Again and again, fleeing
southward, they saw the same thing happen as the Canadian Mounties reined
to an abrupt halt. The tribes of the Blackfeet Confederacy living along what
is now the United States-Canadian border came to refer to that potent but
invisible demarcation as the ‘Medicine Line.’ It seemed to them almost a
supernatural manifestation.”1

Nearly two centuries later, borders
between the U.S. and its neighbors to
the north and south continue to be a
source of consternation for indigenous
people, although today, they offer
fewer compensatory benefits.2 Instead,
for the more than 40 tribes that
live along or near the northern and
southern borders of the U.S., as well
as a comparable number of Canadian
First Nations, tightened security
around borders has meant increased
difficulty in pursuing intertribal trade
and exchange, greater obstacles to
delivery of social and health services
to tribal members who live across
national borders and the attenuation
of social and kinship networks. Perhaps
most importantly, barriers to border
mobility undercut efforts to keep alive
or re-create cultural traditions and
practices that native leaders claim are
critically important to the identities
and well-being of their members. In
the U.S., tribes have responded by
calling for the creation of a separate

border-crossing protocol that would, for
example, accept tribal ID cards in lieu
of passports. Although under the new
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
(WHTI) the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has agreed to temporarily
accept tribal ID cards, conflicts continue
over what tribes would need to do in
order to create the “enhanced” tribal
ID cards that DHS will be requiring in
June 2009, and where the funding for
such measures will come from (DHS
2008, Thompson 2008). Similar ID
cards have been proposed for Canadian
First Nations. Native people would
also like to restrict physical searches of
members who are crossing borders to
participate in traditional ceremonies in
order to avoid the de-sanctification of
religious objects or regalia that occurs
when objects are seen or handled by
unauthorized people. In addition, tribes
are demanding a greater role in DHS
initiatives directed at counter-terrorism
and emergency preparedness, including
direct access to funding. Currently,

Sharon O’Brien, (1984),
“The Medicine Line: A
Border Dividing Tribal
Sovereignty, Economies and
Families,” 53 Fordham
Law Review, p. 315.
1

More than 260 miles of
the U.S. international border is under the jurisdiction
of Indian tribal governments (Tribal Amendments
to Homeland Security Act
of 2002, p. 4, 2004).
2
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DHS grants go almost entirely to states,
who are supposed to share them with
tribes, but according to the tribes,
seldom do. This article focuses upon the
special problems that recent changes in
border policy pose to American Indian
Tribes and Canadian First Nations and
evaluates arguments for and against the
creation of special border protocols for
native peoples.
The case of border policy and native
people presents interesting challenges
for policy makers and social theorists.
Post 9/11, federal, state and local
governments have embarked on
ambitious efforts to strengthen national
security, and this has occasioned
significant hardening of borders.
Whether the strategy adopted by the
U.S. government and its allies to respond
to security threats has, on balance, been
successful, will continue to be debated
for some time. For the sake of argument,
we will make the assumption that U.S.
residents potentially benefit from
efforts to increase domestic security.
At the same time, we must note that
border policy measures generate costs
such as increased inconvenience, delays
at border crossing points, dampening of
trade, etc. (Globerman and Storer 2006).
We will assume, once again for the sake
of argument, that the aggregate benefits
of recent border security policy changes
outweigh their costs. Somewhat less
controversially, we suggest that in
creating policies and procedures
aimed at increasing border security,
2

governments should aim to treat all
groups under the same set of rules and
procedures unless there is a compelling
reason to treat them differently. This
reflects a widely-shared belief that good
governance requires government to
treat groups impartially or with equal
concern.
Whatever benefits are to be had from
tightened border security take the form
of a public good—once available to one,
they are available to all. Perhaps more
importantly in this context, their value
is roughly equal for everyone, since
anyone could conceivably be the victim
of a terrorist attack. The same cannot
be said of the costs of various efforts
to increase border security. Some sorts
of businesses, those dealing in imports
and exports in North America, for
example, could be expected to feel the
costs of such policies more keenly, as
could frequent travelers. And obviously
border regions are most directly
affected by changes in protocols for
border crossing. As a general rule, is
government obliged to make special
allowances to take account of the
distribution of costs in implementing
policies? Unless costs are quite large,
the answer would seem to be “no,”
with the implicit justification that: (1)
in a well-governed polity, some sort of
rough justice emerges over time and
across different policy areas, as groups
who are “losers” in one area emerge as
“winners” in another; and (2), attempts
to fine-tune policies with respect to
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their differential costs and benefits run
a significant risk of favoring one group
over another, or at least of creating a
public perception that fundamental
tenets of impartiality are being violated.
All of this would seem to argue
against the position Tribes/First Nations
have taken in demanding special
consideration in border policy. Yet
there are also arguments supporting the
tribal perspective. For example, in some
cases, when asymmetries are very large
or where the circumstances of different
groups are markedly dissimilar, we do
treat different groups differently, and to
do otherwise would strike many people
as manifestly unfair. Sometimes it might
even be said that equal concern requires
differential treatment, such as when
public health care dollars are channeled
to
patients
undergoing
dialysis
treatment, rather than being doled
out on some other basis—one person/
one share, for example. The question
then becomes, when are asymmetries
great enough to allow or even require
that governments treat different
groups differently? Do the impacts on
tribes in the case of border policy rise
to that level? What, if any, additional
questions should we be asking in
determining when differences between
groups should make a difference in the
way policies are crafted and carried out?
Developing a full-fledged theory of
when and why differential treatment
is deserved or even required—one that

could stand up against really difficult
cases—is beyond the scope of this paper.
Nor does the paper dwell on the legal
reasoning that has led tribes to argue
that under treaty law they are entitled
to the right to freely cross borders,
trade with other aboriginal people, be
exempted from import/export taxes,
and in other ways be subject to fewer
restrictions than are people who are not
the descendents of native treaty signers.
A number of law review articles address
these issues (O’Brien 1984, Castella
2000, Osburn 2000, Lepsch 2002,
Luna-Firebaugh 2005, Tonra 2006, Di
Iorio 2007). My goals for this paper are
different, and somewhat more modest.
By presenting a series of representative
cases depicting the problems faced by
tribes, my intention is to elucidate some
sorts of asymmetries in the distribution
of costs and benefits associated with
efforts to seek greater security through
the hardening of border policies. In
addition, I attempt to draw from, and
apply, insights from recent academic
discussions about multiculturalism,
and how governments should proceed
in recognizing and responding to
the needs of cultural minorities in
policy making. Hopefully, this will
lead to some rudimentary conclusions
about the effects of border policies on
indigenous people, while at the same
time contributing in some way to a
broader discussion of culture and equity
in policy-making.

3
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ALONG THE U.S./MEXICO
BORDER

Between Texas and
California, there are eight
tribes with communities
on both sides of the border: Kumeyaay, Cocopah,
Tohono O’odham, Yaqui,
Gila River Pima, Yavapai,
Ysleta del Sur (Tira) and
Kickapoo.
3
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For the many tribes/bands living in
and around what are now considered
the borderlands of the U.S. and Mexico,
the establishment of a boundary that
cut through native lands threatened to
utterly transform social relations and
kinship networks, subsistence patterns
and cultural and religious practices.3
Productive resources are spread thinly
and unevenly in the arid southwest,
and for native people, migration over
large territories was a necessary and
time-honored way of life. Migration
was in some sense intrinsic to native
culture. And until recently, the needs of
members of the Yaqui, the Kumeyaay,
the Cocopah Nation and other tribes
living along what is now the U.S./
Mexico border were accorded some
deference by federal border protection
agencies. Often, the usual bordercrossing protocols were simply waived
for native people—the Tohono O’odham
had a number of unofficial crossing
places spread throughout their 75mile border with Mexico, for example,
and these were rarely even monitored.
In other cases, regular cross border
migration of certain tribes was officially
recognized and sanctioned. The Texas
Band of Kickapoo, for example, has
both Mexican and U.S. members and
has for decades lived in Nacimiento,
Mexico, during the winter and traveled
to Eagle Pass, Texas, to work as migrant
farm hands for the rest of the year. In
1983, Congress passed the Texas Band

of Kickapoo Act, which ensured that
Kickapoo could freely cross the border
into Mexico and return at will.
Many tribes had hoped they might
be able to make similar political
arrangements. Yet growing concerns
about
drug
trafficking,
about
undocumented immigrants and, post9/11, fears about terrorism have resulted
in a growing inflexibility on the part of
the federal government. The situation
of the Tohono O’odham Nation is
perhaps the most vivid example of the
negative, albeit largely unintended,
consequences of recent government
efforts toward greater border security.

TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION
In 1848, the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo established the boundary line
between the U.S. and Mexico at the Gila
River, which meant that the territories
of the people known as the Tohono
O’odham became part of Mexico.
Five years later, the Gadsden Purchase
established the southern boundary
of the United States at its present
location, and in so doing, bisected
the territory of the Tohono O’odham.
Today, the reservation is comprised
of 2.8 million acres (about the size of
Connecticut), abutting 75 miles of the
Mexican border, and reaches across the
border into northern Sonora, Mexico.
The Tohono O’odham Nation has
about 27,000 members, more than
a thousand of whom live across the
border in Mexico. About half of the
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remaining tribal members live on the
reservation. For the Tohono O’odham,
the Yaqui and other native people of
the region, the freedom to travel the
many paths criss-crossing the border
has always been essential—to gather
medicinal plants, to collect a type of
clay used at childbirth, or to practice
the annual round of ceremonies that
sustain the traditional religion and
culture. While at the time of treaties
the Tohono O’odham were not granted
dual citizenship nor given explicit
permission to move freely across the
border, cross-border travel for work,
for socializing and for participation in
religious ceremonies was an established
and accepted practice for more than a
century. In the mid-1980s that began to
change, and by the mid-1990s, it began
to change dramatically.
Today, parts of the formerly quiet,
isolated
reservation
have
been

transformed into an area bristling
with weapons, new roads, spotlights
and military surveillance vehicles.
Beginning in the 1990s, a series of
strategic decisions were made by federal
agencies to clamp down on illegal entry
at popular border crossing points—
beginning in San Diego, California, with
“Operation Gatekeeper” (1994), later
spreading eastward with “Operation
Safeguard” (1995) in central Arizona,
and then “Operation Rio Grande” in
the southernmost tip of Texas in 1998.4
Various reasons have been suggested
for these successive waves of intense
border security—to displace drug
and human-trafficking from densely
populated areas to less visible locations
and to change behavior of wouldbe crossers by re-channeling activity
to areas with highly inhospitable
conditions. The resulting “funnel
effect” relocated vast amounts of illegal
border-crossing activity to the Tohono

Between 1994 and 1997,
the budget for the Department of Immigration and
Naturalization Services
doubled, the number of
Border Patrol agents nearly
doubled and the amount of
fencing more than doubled.
We do not have precise
figures on the number of
miles of additional roads
or high illumination
floodlights that have been
installed since then.
4

Tohono O’odham reservation is shown in southern Arizona. Map Courtesy of EPA.
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O’odham reservation, where summer
temperatures have been known to reach
130 degrees, water is scarce and the
terrain difficult. The costs to the Tohono
O’odham have been significant.

Testimony of Vivian
Juan-Saunders, Chairperson, Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona in Hearing
before the Committee on
Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate,
concerning Tribal Government Amendments to the
Homeland Security Act of
2002. July 30, 2003.
5

In 2006, average per capita income in the United
States was $25,352 (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2007)
6
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Testifying at congressional hearings
in 2003, then-Chairwoman Vivian
Juan-Saunders reported that in 2002
and 2003 nearly 1,500 undocumented
immigrants were crossing reservation
lands every day.5 The figures are roughly
the same today. More than 60 bodies
are recovered every year (McCombs
2007). The reservation is second only
to Nogales, Arizona, in terms of the
quantities of drugs being smuggled
across the U.S./Mexico border. Residents
report that their homes are broken into
by desperate migrants in search of food,
water, or money. Many also complain
of conflicts with Border Patrol officers.
Some Tohono O’odham members have
themselves been seduced into smuggling
of either drugs or immigrants, which,
given an official unemployment rate
of 42 percent and a per capita income
of only $8,000 per year, is hardly
surprising.6 The 71-member Tohono
O’odham police force spends more
than half of its time chasing traffickers,
recovering abandoned cars, cleaning up
trash and rescuing ill-fated immigrants
or recovering their remains. Every year
the tribe and the Indian Public Health
service spends nearly $7 million on a
combination of law enforcement, health
care and related services (Dougherty
2007, Lewin 2005).

The tribe, which in the past had
resisted efforts of the Border Patrol
to establish itself on the reservation,
is internally divided on how best to
respond to the myriad problems it
is currently facing involving border
issues. The tribal leadership has invited
the Border Patrol and other federal
law enforcement to assist in stemming
the flow of drugs and undocumented
immigrants and has approved the
construction of permanent Border
Patrol facilities on Tohono O’odham
land. Yet while the tribe has supported
the construction of a barrier to vehicles
along its border, Tribal Chairman Ned
Norris has gone on record as opposing
the sort of heavily-fortified wall that he
claims is currently being planned by
DHS under the “Secure Border Fence
Act of 2007” (McCombs 2007).
In addition, tribal officials complain
that DHS rarely consults with them and
that tribes are not being reimbursed
for expenditures made in response to
border problems. The tribe contends
that DHS has ignored the “government
to government” relationship that
federal agencies are required by law
to adopt toward tribes and has been
fundamentally unresponsive to the
needs of the Tohono O’odham for
additional funding, or with respect to
planning or implementation of border
security initiatives. Tribal Chairwoman
Vivian Juan-Saunders testified before
Congress in 2003 in support of legislation
that would have allowed greater tribal
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participation in planning and increased
funding of tribal initiatives under the
DHS, but to no avail.
While increased trafficking of humans
and drugs across reservation borders has
caused a variety of environmental and
security problems, as well as shortfalls
in resources for law enforcement and
medical treatment, many Tohono
O’odham consider the larger problem
to be the omnipresence of Border Patrol
and other federal law enforcement
agents. Some are said to fear the Border
Patrol and DEA agents as much as,
if not more than, than they do the
undocumented immigrants. The Border
Patrol has been taking increasingly
aggressive
measures
to
curtail
smuggling, and tribal members report
being met with spotlights at night
in their own backyards and having
officers walk into homes unannounced
to interrogate people in the middle of
the night. Cars and their occupants are
routinely searched. Caught between
smugglers and edgy Border Patrol
agents, many people are said to be
afraid to leave their homes, especially
at night. For groups such as Alianza
Indigina Sin Fronteras (Indigenous
Alliance Without Borders), the situation
on the Tohono O’odham reservation
simply demonstrates, in a particularly
dramatic fashion, what they see as the
moral bankruptcy of recent bordertightening initiatives. Members of the
organization express a sense of kinship
with undocumented migrants, many of

whom are indigenous themselves, who
risk their lives for an opportunity to take
low-wage work in the U.S. Despite the
fact that the Tohono O’odham recently
passed a law making it a crime to shelter
illegal immigrants, some tribal members
have vowed to continue to put out
water barrels for thirsty immigrants and
to search for the bodies of those who
die while making the attempt to cross
(McCombs 2008).

TRIBES ALONG THE CANADA/
U.S. BORDER
Tribes that share a border with
Canada include the Mohawk (New York
and Ontario and Quebec), Blackfeet
(Alberta and Montana), Red Lake Band
of Chippewa (Minnesota and Canada),
Aroostook Band of Micmac (Maine and
New Brunswick) and Houlton Band
Maliseet (Maine and New Brunswick).7
Other tribes, such as the Lummi,
or Sto’lo, or any of the dozens of
Coast Salish tribes/bands of Western
Washington and British Columbia, are
close to, but not directly on the border.
Nonetheless, the cultural and social
links between them are important,
and current border policy threatens to
undermine these relationships.

THE MOHAWK TRIBE
The boundaries that bisected the
Mohawk’s traditional territory were
fixed by the 1783 Treaty of Paris. A
dozen years later, Mohawk bands on
the U.S. side of the border ceded most
of their lands to the State of New York,

7

Lepsch, Peter D. 2003.
7

Not our borders:
Indigenous people
and the struggle to
maintain shared lives
and cultures in post9/11 North America
Sara Singleton, Ph.D.

One recent example
of cooperative policing
involved 300 law enforcement agents, including
Mohawk Peacekeepers from
the Kahnawake, Kanesatake and Akwesasne
communities in Quebec,
Ontario and New York;
the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and
provincial police in Quebec
and Ontario. Fifteen raids
resulted in 30 arrests and
the confiscation of drugs,
cash and weapons (Toensing 2008).
8

8

and took up residence on the current
14,000-acre reservation around the
village of St. Regis. On the Canadian
side, which borders the provinces of
Ontario and Quebec, as well as New
York State, about 12,000 Mohawks live
on a reserve of 24,000 acres (O’Brien
1984). Mohawks are governed by the St.
Regis Tribal Council, which governs the
American side, the Mohawk Council
of Akwesasne, which governs the
Canadian side, and a parallel system
of traditional chiefs on both sides,
who lack formal governing powers
but retain considerable influence. In
addition, Mohawks must deal with
both the Canadian and U.S. federal
governments and their respective
state and/or provincial governments.
Planning,
economic
development
projects, and even the delivery of social
services is complicated by the network
of governments. Widespread poverty
on the reservation, in combination
with the reservation’s strategic location
along the St. Lawrence Seaway, make
smuggling an extremely attractive
proposition to many tribal members.
Even the tribal chairman admits that
smuggling has been a way of life for the
Mohawk reaching back to the days of Al
Capone. Today, it seems to be reaching
epidemic proportions.
There are 6,000 tribal members on the
U.S. side of the Mohawk reservation,
and federal investigators estimate that
the reservation hosts 10-15 major
Indian crime organizations, moving

about $1 billion of drugs across the
border annually (Kershaw 2006). Many
tribal members themselves are heavily
involved with the drug trade—as users,
as “mules,” and increasingly, as largescale dealers. Illegal immigrants are also
being trafficked through the St. Regis
reservation. The Mohawk Tribe has an
agreement with federal and state officials
that prohibits police from patrolling the
river’s shoreline and the many islands
that lie within tribal territory. Especially
during the winter, when the river freezes
and can be crossed (with difficulty) over
the ice, the area becomes what one New
York newspaper called an “express lane”
for smuggling drugs, cigarettes, people
or anything else that yields a profit
(N.Y. Post, 2008). Despite spending
more than half of its revenues from
casinos and other tribal businesses—
about $2 million in all—on border
patrol and other law enforcement every
year, the tribal police resources are
clearly out-matched. There are some
indications that corruption within
tribal government has contributed to
the inability to stem the tide of drugs
and violence. To be sure, there are also
instances of successful cooperation
between tribal and non-tribal law
enforcement agencies.8 Yet all in all, it
would be difficult to dismiss the very
real concerns law enforcement officials
have about current safeguards against
terrorism, drug smuggling and human
trafficking within the portion of the
Canada/U.S. border that lies within the
Mohawk Nation.
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PACIFIC NORTHWEST TRIBES
In the summer of 2007, the Lummi
Nation, a Western Washington tribe
of about 4,000 people living on a
37-square mile reservation, hosted a
weeklong-event entitled “Paddle-toLummi.” The overarching purpose of
the gathering was cultural renewal of
the traditional ties between the many
Coastal Salish peoples living along the
Georgia Basin/Puget Sound shoreline on
either side of the Canada/U.S. border, of
the traditional mode of transportation
via large, sea-going canoes, and of
traditional practices such as the
potlatch. Potlatches, which include
feasts and gift-giving by the ceremonial
host, were once integral to the social
system and ordered hierarchy of the
Coast Salish. The “Paddle-to-Lummi”
event marked the first potlatch since
1937, and 73 canoes and hundreds of
paddlers made the journey, some from
as far as 400 miles to the north. About
12,000 friends, family and curious
spectators made the trip via more
conventional means of transportation.
In order for the event to take place,
thousands of people needed to cross
the Canada/U.S. border, some through
shared marine waters. Initially, the task
of facilitating the border crossings of so
many people, including children and
others who lacked required documents,
looked almost insurmountable to
organizers. Fortunately, U.S. Customs
and Border Patrol officials were willing
to issue group permits for the canoe
paddlers. Still, many who otherwise

would have attended may have been
deterred because of fears that recent
border “hardening” would expose
them to unwanted scrutiny or prevent
their entry entirely. The problems that
presented themselves for the organizers
of the event are typical of the sorts
of obstacles to cultural preservation
posed by tightened border security.
For example, it is an ongoing source of
tension for traditional tribal members
that religious objects or spiritual regalia
that are being taken across borders for
use in ceremonial gatherings are subject
to border searches.
Cultural renewal is a priority goal
for the Lummi leadership, as it is
for many tribes and First Nations. Native
leaders believe that the restoration
of cultural traditions is key to
addressing problems endemic to many
indigenous communities—alcoholism,
drug addiction and the array of problems
left in their wake. The Lummi and
other area tribes have created a variety
of initiatives aimed at re-connecting
with their “relatives” to the north.
These include pow-wows, religious
ceremonies and “gatherings” aimed at
monitoring the environmental threats
that threaten the remaining vestiges of
a traditional way of life.
It is obvious why the Lummi and
other tribes would prefer a system for
border crossing that would allow tribal
members to use identification cards
issued by their own tribal governments
9
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instead of passports. Some tribal
members (although their numbers
diminish every year) do not have
birth certificates. There is considerable
suspicion of government in many
indigenous communities. For example,
the practice of removing Indian children
from their families and placing them
in residential schools where they were
often beaten, shamed and mistreated,
is still alive in the memories of older
Indians on both sides of the Canada/
U.S. border. Many native people are
simply uneasy about placing themselves
in a situation where their lives are open
to government scrutiny. Others fear
that their applications will fail because
of previous entanglements with legal
authorities—from DUI charges to failure
to pay child support. Canada Border
Services Agency agents have been
known to prevent entry for those who
have been convicted of such offenses.
Either individually or in combination,
these factors dissuade people from
crossing the Canada/U.S. border, even to
attend a relative’s funeral or participate
in a ceremony. In this way, familial and
cultural connections are attenuated and
become less meaningful.
Recently DHS has given ground
on the issue of cross-border travel
documents. Under the newly-enacted
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
(WHTI), all travelers to and from
Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean and
Bermuda must present a passport or
other WHTI-compliant document (DHS
10

2008). DHS has agreed to allow tribes to
create “enhanced” tribal ID cards that
can be used in lieu of passports. Yet the
cost of creating the card system, which,
under DHS regulations, would require
a computer system that would allow
immediate electronic verification at
ports of entry, will prohibit most tribes
from exercising this option (Thompson
2008). So far, no federal or state funds
have been earmarked for this purpose.
Despite the costs imposed on
indigenous populations by recent
security policy, the concerns of federal
agents with respect to the threats posed
by drug smuggling, human trafficking
and terrorism are not without
foundation. Like the Mohawk and
many other U.S. tribes, the Lummi
Nation struggles to control drug
smuggling. A booming reservation
trade in OxyContin was worth $1.5
million in 2003, more than double the
profits from the tribe’s new casino (NYT
2006). According to one convicted drug
dealer, it is common in the course of
transporting drugs across the border
to hide drugs in objects that are then
claimed to be materials associated
with religious practices. Smugglers
are obviously attempting to take
advantage of the fact that customs
inspectors have been roundly criticized
for cultural insensitivity in the past,
and have subsequently become more
respectful (and perhaps less rigorous) in
their inspection of sacred objects. The
federally unrecognized Kaweah Indian
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Nation is currently under investigation
in several states for selling tribal
identification cards to undocumented
aliens after promising that the
cards would protect the aliens from
deportation (Associated Press 2007).

INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
TRIBES AND DHS
In the U.S., relations between federal
agencies and Indian tribes are supposed
to take place in the context of what is
called a “government-to-government
relationship.” Essentially, this means
that planning, implementation and
funding of federal programs occurs
through a collaborative process between
a given tribe and the federal agency(ies).
The relationship between the federal
government and tribes is supposed to
be direct—tribes are similar to states
in that respect, and very different
from local governments, who are
subservient to state governments, and
must rely on them for funding. In 2000,
Executive Order 13175 formalized this
relationship and made consultation and
coordination with tribal governments
a requirement for all federal agencies
(Federal Register 2001). Yet until quite
recently, DHS’s record of consultation
and cooperation with tribes has been
“very bad,” according to Heather
Thompson of the National Congress
of Indian Tribes (Thompson 2008).
Thompson attributes this to the new
agency’s lack of historical relationships
with tribes, as well as to the fact that

DHS does not have a formal institutional
structure for tribal consultation or even
a permanent Native American policy
staff position.
The lack of direct DHS fundingprograms for building tribal capacities in
law enforcement and domestic security
is a very serious ongoing problem.
Nearly all DHS grant funding goes to
states, and tribes are forced to compete
with local governments for the resources
they need to maintain border security.
In 2003, legislation was introduced that
would have acknowledged the distinct
status of tribes and would have made
them eligible to compete for federal
funding associated with homeland
security initiatives, but it failed to make
it out of committee. During legislative
hearings before the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs, then-president of the
National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI) Tex Hall reported that his
own reservation, Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation in North Dakota—the site
of 18 Minuteman missile silos—received
no funds from either DHS or the U.S.
military. Hall added that in the previous
year, the State of North Dakota received
just over $13.2 million for homeland
security, of which $73,000 was to go
to tribes. And since that money was to
be spent to hire a Homeland Security
Liaison to work with Indian tribes,
none of the funds were actually going
to be spent on direct law enforcement
or training of tribal personnel (U.S.
Senate Hearings on Tribal Government
11
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Amendments to Homeland Security Act
of 2002, p. 47).

The term “liberal” in
this context refers not to
everyday usage of “liberal”
and “conservative,” but
rather to an ideology or set
of principles upon which
modern democracies have
historically been premised.
Individual freedom, a full
complement of civil rights
and political equality are
among those values closely
associated with traditional
“liberal” ideology.
9
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During
recent
congressional
negotiations over the allocation of
DHS grant funds for the 2008 fiscal
year, Congress established a very
small program that tribes could apply
to directly. But unlike similar (but
much larger) state programs, funding
mechanisms were implemented in such
a way as to create a ceiling beyond which
funds could not grow. The program
also contains a series of restrictions
that will prevent the majority of tribes
from obtaining funding (Thompson
2008). For the great bulk of federal
grant money, tribes must still petition
the states, which, in the context of
internal conflicts over how to allocate
scarce funds, have little reason to
award money to tribes rather than local
governments. Nor is the problem limited
to funds for grants for infrastructure,
law enforcement or capacity building.
Under the rules governing the Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency
(FEMA), tribes suffering the effects of a
natural disaster must appeal first to their
state governments, which must then
petition on their behalf before a disaster
declaration can be made. The injury to
tribes is two-fold: first, as the result of
the history of land dispossession and
subsequent reallocation, reservations
are generally in poorer areas, which
are often those most vulnerable to
flooding, wildfires or other natural
catastrophes; second, since states have

little responsibility or taxation authority
on Indian reservations, their incentives
are fundamentally incompatible with
the best interests of tribes.

DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSIONS
At this point we return to the
questions set out in the introduction.
Now that we have some sense of current
conditions facing a representative group
of indigenous peoples living on or near
areas where the U.S. borders Canada and
Mexico, what should we conclude? Are
tribes bearing an unfair portion of the
costs of border security? If so, do such
asymmetries justify the creation of a
separate protocol for Native Americans
and First Nations? Do current debates
in the literature about multiculturalism
provide useful guidance in this and
similar dilemmas, where the interests
of the minority populations and those
of the general public appear to be in
conflict?
First, a brief explanation of the
positions taken in debates over how
governments should accommodate the
social reality of multiculturalism. The
traditional, liberal position9 argues for
individual rights and equal treatment
of all citizens in the public sphere,
and grants significant autonomy to
individuals in their private lives and to
the formation and internal workings
of groups and communities, as long
as these do not threaten individual
rights or those of other groups and
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communities. This set of arguments is
consistent with the high value liberals
place on freedom, but also, many would
argue, represents the principles best
suited to achieve mutual toleration in
countries that are increasingly diverse—
ethnically, racially and culturally.
Liberal egalitarians have generally
envisioned this emancipatory project
being accompanied by collective action
aimed at bringing about conditions of
greater social and economic equality
(Barry 2001).
Conversely, the multiculturalism
model argues that simply protecting
basic legal and political rights is
insufficient—that in order to fulfill
its obligation to demonstrate “equal
concern” for all people, government
must provide support for and in some
sense endorse the distinct cultures
of minority groups. In what to some
people, at least, is its most persuasive
version, the multiculturalist model is
linked to freedom and autonomy. The
basic argument is that freedom involves
individuals making choices about the
sort of lives they wish to lead, and that
their ability to make meaningful choices
presupposes an array of choices that
arise from, and are made intelligible
by, the societal culture within which
one identifies (Kymlicka 1995). Thus it
is governments’ obligation to provide
some level of public recognition and
support for minority cultures, and,
in some circumstances, to waive
certain legal requirement and/or grant

categorical exceptions to policies that
run counter to cultural practices and
beliefs.
Proponents of the multiculturalist
position argue that failing to undertake
such measures is both wrong (in the
sense that it violates the obligations
that governments have toward their
citizens); and furthermore would
likely lead to the continuing erasure of
distinct minority cultures. Opponents
claim that multiculturalist policies may
exacerbate existing tensions between
groups in society while at the same time
misdirecting efforts away from the more
important project of greater economic
and social equality between all people
(Barry 2001).10
With that abbreviated background
to the debate, we can now reconsider
the cases. Several questions are being
posed: is the securitization of borders
resulting in disproportionate costs
being imposed on indigenous people
to an extent that governments are
obligated to make changes in policy?
And if policy changes are called for,
then could appropriate policy changes
be made within the current liberal
framework of governance, e.g. a single
set of laws applicable to everyone; or,
as multiculturalists have argued in
other cases, must government respond
by creating a separate set of laws and
regulations, in this case separate border
protocols for indigenous people?
Before tackling these questions, it may

In addition to academic
critics of multiculturalism,
the latter criticism has
been voiced by aboriginal
leader Noel Pearson in
Australia (Banting 2005).
Attempts to empirically
test the claim that multiculturalism undermines
public support and generosity for welfare states
have produced ambiguous
results (Banting 2005).
Yet casual observation—
through electronic blogs
and letters to the editor
in response to articles
about “special” rights
for indigenous people for
border crossing and other
activities— suggests there
is considerable resentment
of such policies, what are
perceived as favoritism by
government.
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be useful to divide the damages/costs
experienced by indigenous people
into two categories: those that we will
call culture-neutral—costs that could
be expected to be felt by any group of
people in a similar situation; and what
we will term culture-sensitive costs, by
which we mean costs that are particular
to a group’s culture and identity, or at
least for which cultural identity could be
expected to have the effect of increasing
the injury. In the first instance, there
is no need to rely on the arguments
or prescriptions of multiculturalists,
while in the case of culture-sensitive
costs, there may be, although this is not
necessarily the case.

TOHONO O’ODHAM, A
CASE OF LARGELY CULTURENEUTRAL COSTS
It seems clear that the Tohono
O’odham are being saddled with a
hugely disproportionate share of costs
associated with efforts to safeguard
society from terrorism and to reduce
illegal activities associated with drugs
and human trafficking. It is hard to
see how this is fair or just, particularly
when some of the worst aspects of
the situation facing tribal members
result from a deliberate effort to choke
off trafficking in other areas of the
country and funnel it into the Sonoran
Desert, when the spillover effects of
such a policy on local people were
clearly predictable. The underlying
structure of the Tohono O’odham case
is analogous to the many situations
14

termed “environmental (in)justice,”
where industrial facilities, landfills,
or other locally undesirable land uses
(LULUs) are sited next to people who
are poor, nonwhite, or both, with the
result that relatively powerless people
are exposed to toxic substances more
frequently and more intensely than
are affluent, relatively powerful people.
With respect to environmental policies,
U.S. federal requirements were changed
in the early 1990s and now mandate
that government officials consider
the effects of projects and policies on
minority or low-income populations.
The same logic that resulted in such
changes in policy should apply here.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how
public policy that concentrates costs
so heavily on any group of people,
regardless of the cultural or ethnic
identities, can withstand scrutiny. With
respect to many of the problems faced
by the Tohono O’odham—risks posed
by high levels of criminal activity,
sustained government surveillance,
including frequent searches and other
invasions of privacy, damage to the
natural environment, and so on—
culturally specific arguments are not
required since it is enough simply to
look at basic tenants of good governance
with respect to how burdens are (or
should be) shared.

CULTURE-SENSITIVE COSTS—A
PLACE FOR MULTICULTURALIST
POLICIES?
Yet not all of the costs faced by the
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Tohono O’odham or other tribes fall
into this category. Here the argument
for differential treatment—for example,
border protocols that would allow tribal
members to travel freely (or at least with
fewer encumbrances) across borders—
must rest on cultural arguments,
e.g. the damage that will be done to
tribal members, either individually
or collectively, and tribal culture. For
example, for a variety of reasons,
native people may be more likely to
encounter difficulties with meeting
the requirements of border officials. In
addition, many tribes are engaged in
deliberate, concerted efforts to restore
and revitalize cultural traditions as a key
component in a larger effort to address
the myriad social, health-related and
other problems that are endemic to
reservations. There is every reason to
believe that such approaches are more
likely to succeed than conventional
methods. A large, longitudinal study
comparing economic development
levels on a number of Indian reservations
concludes that the “closeness of
fit” between traditional culture and
political/economic institutions is a
powerful influence on success (Cornell
& Kalt, undated). Cultural renewal
efforts are clearly being hampered by
border controls that discourage people
from crossing borders. For these reasons,
tribes could contend that culturespecific costs are sufficient to require
exceptions be made.
On the opposing side, government

officials might argue that the interests
of tribes must be overridden by the
even stronger interest the public has in
domestic security. Much of the 260 miles
of the international border that abuts
Indian reservations has been shown to
be quite porous, and the result has been
a concentration of border-related illegal
activity. Many Indian reservations are
currently grappling with crime rates
that are nearly double those on nonIndian communities, with few obvious
signs of success (Perry 2004). While
no serious terrorism threats have been
discovered on reservations, it seems
likely that this is not because such
threats have been thwarted, but rather
that they have yet to be attempted. If
we assume that discouraging terrorism
and drug trafficking or diminishing the
numbers of immigrants that enter the
U.S. illegally are, either individually or
in combination, necessary, important
public policy goals, then it is not hard
to see why the idea of relaxing border
crossing requirements to accommodate
tribal preferences strikes many people
as irrational. This lack of confidence in
the tribal law enforcement capacities is
no doubt part of what lies behind DHS’s
apparent usurpation of the tribal role in
ensuring domestic security.

WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN
DO: BUILDING CAPACITY AND
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE
TRIBAL ROLE
Yet it is here that current government
policy is most mistaken. As has been
15
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demonstrated in locations all over
the world, the maintenance of social
order and law enforcement requires
adequate funding—either internally or
from higher levels of government—and
support from the community. Failing to
fund tribal law enforcement agencies
and train tribal personnel in the
implementation of homeland security
initiatives and then using inadequate
capacity as a reason to deny tribes’ own
efforts to balance security with cultural
needs clearly is a case of blaming the
victim. A more reasonable, equitable
and workable approach would first focus
on compensating tribes for damages
that have occurred as the unintended
consequences of new border security
regimes, and then on making significant
investments in building tribes’ own
capacities to respond to security threats,
cross-border drug trade, etc. Rather
than interpreting signs of inefficiency
or inadequacy as a mandate to step in
and take over, DHS should reflect on the
failures of such efforts in the past and
attempt to engage tribal communities.
A variety of models are already
functioning where responsibility for
policy in a particular area is shared
between federal and tribal governments.
In fact, both the U.S. Department of
Defense and the U.S. Department of
Justice have institutionalized programs
that create processes for collaboration
and
coordination
with
tribes.
Many states have similar programs.
There is solid evidence to indicate
that heightened responsibility or
16

sovereignty is a necessary condition of
better performance and accountability
on Indian reservations (Cornell and
Kalt, undated). The justification for
such initiatives does not require an
endorsement of the entire package of
multiculturalist arguments, although it
would acknowledge that social identity
and indigenous culture are important
to people and worthy of protection by
government. In this case, (although
perhaps not in others) most of what
I term culture-sensitive costs could be
addressed without changing underlying
assumptions
about
impartiality
and equal treatment under the law.
Government agencies could respect
local autonomy and benefit from local
knowledge by allowing tribes to devise,
by whatever means they chose, a border
security regime that would function
in such a way as to meet national
standards.
A number of specific measures that
could advance such an agenda have been
endorsed by NCAI (Thompson 2008).
First, DHS could come into compliance
with current law by institutionalizing
a process for consultation and
coordination with tribal governments.
This could conceivably require the
creation of an office of tribal affairs and
tribal policy, but in light of the size and
scale of resources available to DHS, it
is hard to see why this would not be
feasible. At the same time, tribes could be
better integrated into planning boards
and advisory committees. Second, DHS
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should formalize a government-togovernment relationship with tribes,
which allows tribes to apply directly
to DHS for grants that could be used
for building tribal infrastructure
and capacity. Given the incentive
incompatibilities
discussed
above,
neither states nor tribes are being well
served by the current set of institutional
arrangements. Law enforcement on
Indian reservations will no doubt
remain a sensitive issue for residents of
many local communities and for their
representatives in Congress, particularly
when it involves tribal policing of nonmembers, but the notion that such
conflicts can be resolved by starving
tribes of needed funds is untenable.
It is odd that for more than a decade,

devolution has been the preferred
approach for governments grappling
with a host of difficult problems—
environmental,
law
enforcement,
economic development—while the
institutions and practices surrounding
border policy have been cast in a
rigid, antiquated, top-down structure.
Such a model does have the effect of
centralizing power, but at a high cost to
efficiency, and, in this case, a high cost
to peoples who are closest to the areas of
impact. Whether there will be a change
in the direction of a more equitable,
effective set of policies seems far from
certain, but without it, international
borders abutting Indian reservations
will continue to pose a security threat,
and some of the most vulnerable people
in the U.S. will continue to lose some of
the remaining shards of their cultures.
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